Implicit in virtually any theory of democratic elections is the idea of change-or at least the potential for change. Elections provide the opportunity for citizens to change their party preferences and thus alter the course of government if they so desire. In addition, political parties 
Implicit in virtually any theory of democratic elections is the idea that party vote shares change between elections-or at least there is a real potential for change. Elections provide the opportunity for citizens to change their party preferences and thus alter the course of government. In addition, political parties can change their programmatic positions to attract new voters. This potential for change contributes to making democratic governments accountable and representative of public preferences.
Almost every election is accompanied by media reports of one party shifting their broad political positions in order to court new voters or regain voters lost at the last election. Following an election it is common for political parties to engage in self-reflection to consider whether to and how to adjust in reaction to the voters' recent decision. Indeed, a burgeoning literature in recent years adopts a framework of parties as rational actors who are choosing and altering their political positions, and outlines the criteria for their choices (Adams 2012; Adams et al. 2004; McDonald and Budge 2005; Adams, Haupt and Stoll 2009; Budge, Ezrow, and McDonald 2010; Budge et al. 2012) . If parties and voters did not change their positions between elections in reaction to events and government performance, there would be little reason for more than one election.
Accounts of contemporary party systems also stress the increasing fluidity and volatility of political parties and electoral outcomes (Wren and McElwain 2007; Mainwaring and Zoco 2007) . In addition, the effective number of parties is generally increasing in affluent democracies, so new parties are being added to the electoral mix resulting in increased electoral change. So electoral change appears to be increasing in established democracies.
Our research asks to what degree do parties actually change their broad political positions between elections and tests some of the existing theories of party continuity and change. We bring new empirical evidence to bear on this research topic. Previous empirical studies have almost exclusively used the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) to examine changes in parties' programs. We utilize a time series of citizen perceptions of party positions from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) project. In addition, we supplement these data with evidence from the Chapel Hill Expert Surveys (CHES) in which national experts estimate the parties' ideological positions (Bakker et al. 2012) . The CSES is a coordinated cross-national election survey conducted by national election study teams; participating countries ask a common module of questions in their post-election survey (Klingemann 2009). We argue that there are distinct advantages in using citizen perceptions to measure party positions, since these perceptions are the reality of politics for voters.
The topic of inter-election change in parties' political orientations has important implications for electoral politics and the democratic process. If partisan change follows a voteseeking strategy in which parties shift position to gain more votes, this suggests the factors that drive the calculations of party elites. This may be especially significant if increased electoral volatility reflects the dealignment of contemporary systems, forcing the parties to attract support from undecided voters (Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2012) . Conversely, if parties are policydriven actors acting relatively independent of electoral results, this offers a different image of party competition. The balance between vote-seeking and policy-driven models reflects on the nature of democratic representation (Bishoff 2013; Laver and Sergenti 2012) . This paper is divided into five sections. The next section reviews the existing literature on the vote-seeking and policy-driven logics of party change and continuity between elections. The second section introduces our basic measures of party positions: the Left-Right scale measured through the CSES surveys, the CHES and other studies of party positions. The third section analyzes the stability of Left/Right orientations over several elections to answer the question of how much parties actually do change. The fourth section tests alternative theories to predict party change along the Left/Right scale between elections. Finally, we discuss the implications of our results for the nature of contemporary political parties and for larger issues of electoral choice.
Theories of Party Change
In the lore and research of electoral politics, there is a common belief that parties strategically alter their political positions between elections in order to increase their vote share. Our research focuses on evaluating this model with the new empirical evidence. A counter position argues that political parties have distinct ideological identities and are embedded in a network of supporters that substantially restrict their freedom to significantly change the parties' basic political positions. This section briefly reviews these different potential explanations of party behavior.
Voting-Seeking Strategies
Most of the previous literature on inter-election changes in parties' broad political positions is derived from spatial models that predict how parties consciously follow vote-maximizing strategies (e.g., Budge 1994; Adams et al. 2004; Adams, Haupt and Stoll 2009; Budge et al. 2012; Laver and Sergenti 2012; Adams 2012 ). The spatial model assumes that voter preferences are exogenous and relatively fixed, while parties vary their political position to maximize their electoral appeal (Downs 1957) . For example, Bill Clinton, Tony Blair and Gerhard Schröder notably pursued more centrist ideological campaigns in successful attempts to win more votesand government control-for their respective parties.
A vote-maximizing strategy of party change can appear in several ways. At the most basic level, vote-maximization implies that parties respond to changes in the position of the median voter along the Left-Right dimension (McDonald and Budge 2005; Adams, Haupt, and Stoll 2009; Ezrow 2010) . For example, if economic conditions or other events produce a substantial leftward or rightward shift in public sentiment, a responsive party system might shift with the public in order to retain their relative vote shares (Cf. Grofman 2004) . This is, perhaps, the most basic Downsian hypothesis about parties strategic positioning on the Left-Right scale.
A more party-specific theory suggests that if a party loses voters in one election, there is an incentive to adjust its political profile in order to increase voter support in the next election (Budge 1994; McDonald and Budge 2005; Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009; Somer-Topcu 2009; Budge, Ezrow, and McDonald 2010; Andrews and Money nd; Adams 2012) . To grapple with the ambiguity of choice facing parties, Ian Budge (1994) has offered a parsimonious 'past election hypothesis'. The past election model posits that parties look to the prior election-both vote share and previous ideological changes-for guidance on whether to change positions in the current election. He argues that parties are more likely to move in the same ideological direction as the last time if they gained votes in the previous election. This movement may continue until there is evidence that this strategy is not working for the party, perhaps because the party overshoots its maximal policy position.
If a party has lost votes, there is also a greater likelihood for the party to change strategies to seek new voters. But the Left/Right direction of change for losers is more ambiguous. In some instances, vote losses might encourage a movement toward the center and the median voter. This rationale is often applied to majoritarian electoral systems with a few large parties vying for majority status. The Clinton, Blair and Schröder elections are examples of this logic. In other instances, a party might adopt a more distinct political position to distance itself from its nearby competitors in a multiparty system (Adams, Merrill and Grofman 2005) . Budge (2004) extended the past election hypothesis to argue that if parties lost votes in the last election, they were more likely to move in a different ideological direction than in the previous electoral cycle. Based on analyses of party positions from the Comparative Manifesto Project, Budge found that the past election hypothesis was one of the more successful explanations of inter-election party change.
In addition, most analyses of party change based on the CMP project found that LeftRight change in one election is negatively correlated with change in the previous election (Budge 1994; Budge et al. 2001; Adams et al. 2004 ). Budge describes this as the 'policy alternation model.' There are several possible explanations for this pattern. One theory traces such alternation to the limited information available to party elites on what strategy will be successful, so they explore the alternatives sequentially (Budge 1994: 453) . Another logic holds that parties have a political identity that provides a 'homing' tendency across elections. In one election a party might explore its electoral space by moving slightly to the Left (or Right) to see if this attracts new voters, and then return toward its home in the subsequent election.
1 If a party continues to move in a single direction over multiple elections, it would risk losing its political identity and voter constituency. Such an alternating pattern may also reflect internal organizational struggles between factions within the party that seek to moderate party platforms or pursue distinct policy objectives (McAllister 1991) , and the relative success of these factions may vary over time. Over several elections this pattern might look like a random walk model, but it is really a systematic search for new voters (Laver and Sergenti 2012, ch. 8). Budge (1994) showed that the policy alternation model was also very successful in explaining inter-election party change.
Policy-Driven Strategies
In contrast to rationalist vote-seeking theories, another approach emphasizes the parties' concerns about public policies and their ideological identity (Laver 2005) . While some politicians and parties may change course to win more votes, others believe the party exists to advocate its key principles, which should not be abandoned in the hunt for more electoral support. In the late 1800s U.S. Senator Henry Clay famously said, 'I'd rather be right than president'; it's a sentiment apparently shared by many contemporary politicians on the Left and
Right.
This policy-driven strategy is commonly associated with extreme parties that are presumably more ideologically-oriented than vote maximizing, and thus more rigid in their LeftRight positions. Furthermore, Adams, Merrill and Grofman (2005) theorized that there is an incentive for parties to take more extreme positions, because voters will partially discount these positions in the expectation that the party's actual governing policies will be more moderate. The literature often describes these policy-driven parties as 'niche parties' including communists, green parties, and nationalist parties (Meguid 2005; Adams et al. 2006; Tavits 2007) .
A policy-driven theory would argue that centrist catch-all parties would be more likely to follow vote-seeking strategies and thus be more changeable in their ideological position. In contrast, communist, libertarian, greens and other ideological parties that typically exist at the poles of the Left-Right continuum should be more stable in their political views.
In summary, both the vote-seeking and policy-driven models of party behavior presume that parties are calculating, rational actors in making their programmatic choices. They know what they want, and take appropriate-albeit different-actions. At the same time, there are counter-arguments about the limits of parties in identifying new programs and effecting change.
We test the relative merits of these two rival explanations of party behavior by examining how parties actually change their Left-Right positions over time.
Measuring Party Positions
Analyzing inter-election change in party positions requires a reliable measure of these positions.
The Downsian logic of spatial analysis holds that most party systems can be described as ranging along a single dimension of political competition. Following previous studies, we accept that the Left-Right dimension is useful in summarizing the broad positions of parties and voters (Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2012; Dalton, Farrell and McAllister 2011; Adams et al. 2004; Budge et al. 2001) . We acknowledge that the political space is more complex than a single LeftRight dimension, but we agree with those authors who maintain that the Left-Right dimension provides a meaningful framework for analysis.
We treat the Left-Right dimension as a political reference structure that helps parties and based on elite self-placements (Miller et al., 1999; Thomassen and Schmitt 1997) .
Citizen Perceptions. Another method asks citizens to locate the parties in their nation on the Left/Right scale. The CSES has asked respondents to position themselves and the significant parties on the Left/Right scale. 2 Dalton, Farrell and McAllister (2011, ch. 5) showed that most people can locate themselves and the major parties on the scale.
An extensive literature evaluates and compares these alternative measures of party positions. 3 We believe that there is no single definitive source to identify a party's political position. The best of the available measures depends on the context and the factors being The correlations in Table 1 display a striking agreement among three of the data sources-public perceptions, expert judgments, and political elites. The correlations average slightly above .90, which is very high consistency since the public, experts and political elites are locating the parties at different points in time, with different levels of political information, and presumably somewhat different bases of evaluation (also see Bakker et al. 2012 ).
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The manifesto data are also consistent with the Left-Right positions from the other sources, but to a lesser degree. The correlation between Left-Right in the manifestos and party experts is only .64, which is the same as the correlation between the manifestos and public perceptions of the parties. 9 The factor analysis loadings in the rightmost column of Table 1 show that six variables from the public, experts and elites display very large factor loadings on a first 
Continuity or Change?
The next Crisis. Yet, overall party positions in overall Left-Right terms are strikingly stable. The CHES data in the bottom half of Table 2 yield correlations of .95 or higher across adjacent waves.
Other expert studies of shorter duration or fewer waves have documented this same pattern.
13
Perhaps even more striking the comparisons of party and self-placements by party elites is equally stable over time (see Table 1 ). In contrast, the Comparative Manifesto Project Left-Right scores (RILE) for a pair of elections circa 2000 display a more modest .72 correlation across elections. 14 So in the judgments of both citizens, academic experts and party elites, the empirical evidence underscores the substantial continuity of party Left-Right positions between elections.
Correlations are relative measures of change, and it is equally important to look at the absolute level of change. We calculated the absolute value of the change in party Left-Right positions between election1 and election2. Using the first pair of CSES elections, the median change is only .29 points on the 10-point Left-Right scale, meaning about half of the parties changed by about a quarter of a point or less between two elections. Two-thirds of all parties changed less than .36 scale point between elections. In statistical terms, this is a small amount, especially when we consider the simple random sampling error of mean scores between two opinion surveys in the absence of real change.
The patterns from the CHES are similar. Using the 2002-2006 pair of surveys, the median change is .39 on the 10-point Left-Right scale. And since the expert surveys are typically based on less than 10 experts in a nation, the sampling variability is inevitably much greater.
Furthermore, as with the CSES data, the level of change is about double for the new democracies in CHES compared to established democracies in West Europe. Thus, both citizen and expert perceptions of the parties point to a high level of Left-Right stability.
These results do not mean that change is entirely absent from party systems. For instance, seven parties register absolute change scores of 1.00 or more between elections using the CSES polarized systems conversely may offer more potential to move toward a centrist position.
The characteristics of individual parties also may affect the stability of their ideological position. For example, we expect that young parties have a more fluid political identity as they begin to compete and search for a clear voter base (Tavits 2005 (Tavits , 2006 Birch 2003; Sikk 2005) .
At the other extreme, large established parties, like the two major parties in the U.S. or the SPD and CDU/CSU in Germany, have a substantial institutional base, a network of supporters, and a long political record. Thus in Bayesian terms, because of their past commitments, established parties may find it more difficult to change their image across a pair of elections.
The research literature often stresses the potential importance of party leadership in maintaining or changing a party's political course (Harmel and Janda 1994; cf. Bille 1997) . We might call this the 'Blair hypothesis.' As a new leader, it was presumably easier for Blair to break with the party's past, since the past represented the policies of others. Thus, we hypothesize that a change in party leaders between elections is more likely to produce a change in the party's overall Left-Right position, while stable leadership is likely to result in the party continuing on the same course.
Empirical Analysis
One of the most basic Downsian predictions from the vote-seeking model argues that a party's electoral fortunes in one election shape its behavior in the next election (Budge 1994 This literature suggests that losers will be more mobile, but the literature provides conflicting hypotheses about election winners.
We tested whether change in party votes shares between a first pair of elections (i.e., Ironically, whether a party wins or loses votes at election2, there is a tendency to reverse course by election3. 16 One interpretation is that these political reversals are a policy searching strategy: try a little to the Left and then try a little to the Right (Budge 1994 ; Laver and Sergenti 2012, ch. 8). For example, in the 1980s the German Social Democrats struggled to develop an effective electoral strategy. In one election they leaned toward the center to capture votes from the CDU/CSU, but then the lost votes on the left to the Greens. In the next election they leaned toward the Greens to recapture these votes, but then lost centrists to the CDU/CSU. Their electoral plan seemed to be vacillation rather than strategic.
An alternative view of reversing ideological shifts is that the internal dynamics of parties and their uncertain response to changing political contexts produces a random walk pattern.
Burt's (1998) less benign interpretation is that since there is little real change in party positions, we are seeing random measurement error as an autoregressive relationship.
The potential to study very detailed strategies of partisan behavior is limited because of the modest number of cases in the CSES data. 17 However, we can examine the major factors that might affect whether a party changes its Left-Right position between elections, regardless of the direction of change. That is, we predict the absolute change in Left-Right position of each party between election 1 and election 2 without regard to Left or Right direction.
To examine this question we developed a multivariate model that combines the predictors discussed above, using robust standard errors to adjust for clustering at the country level. Our dependent variable is the absolute change in a party's Left-Right position between election1 and election2 (n=135) based on the first pair of CSES elections (the deviations seen in figure 1 ).
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Vote seeking is reflected as the absolute change in vote share in the previous election.
Parties that see their vote share change between election0 and election1 are more likely to shift Left-Right positions between election1 and election2. Policy-driven behavior is tapped by the policy extremism of the party; extreme ideological parties presumably are guided more by ideology and less likely to change. Additional controls include two party characteristics (age and change in leader) with the effects hypothesized above. The model also contains several measures of national context (new/old democracy, effective number of electoral parties, party system polarization and whether there was a significant change in the party lineup (a new party entered or an established party left) at election1. Because of the restrictions caused by the modest number of cases, we are limited in the range of variables that we could use, which is further reduced by multicollinearity between some of the aggregate contextual variables.
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The first model in Table 3 shows that the absolute change in vote shares in the previous pair of elections has a significant effect in encouraging parties to shift their ideological position Table 3 goes about here = = = Our model also controls for the age of the party and a change in party leaders between the two elections. Neither relationship is statistically significant, although both are in the predicted direction. Prima facie, the lack of an effect for a change in party leaders might seem surprising.
However, some research points out that a party is most likely to select a leader who continues the current course rather than shift direction (Burt 1997; Harmel and Janda 1992) . A change in leader might be an opportunity for strategic change in a party's approach, but it is not a sufficient reason for change.
There are more substantial effects for the institutional context. A second possible explanation is that electoral change is not normally driven by broad ideological considerations as reflected in the Left-Right scale, but by more specific issue concerns. Some electoral research emphasizes that parties compete in defining the agenda focus of elections on terms favorable to their own party (Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2012; Petrocik 1996) . If the public rejects a prominent policy of an incumbent government, they may vote for the opposition to limit this policy or sanction the incumbents. Opposition parties may highlight issues of public concern where their positions are more compatible with the voters, perhaps diminishing the visibility of their overall party program. Thus the salience of specific issues in an election, and changing salience across elections, can drive changes in vote shares. Similarly, if
we could measure party positions on specific issues, we would expect greater change over time than for broad Left-Right positions (Thomassen 2012; Laver and Benoit 2007) . These topics can be explored with the growing number of expert surveys that include both party position and salience on more specific issue dimensions. 27 In short, the value of Left-Right is that it measures the broad framework of political competition; but its limit in explaining electoral change is also that it measures this broad framework.
Third, we focused on the ideological continuity of parties over successive elections. But In summary, the presumption of a single, unified, rational actor model that underlies the Downsian spatial modeling literature may be a poor representation of the short-term choices and actions actually facing political parties. The long-term structure of a party system might be determined by parties' ideological choices. However, the short term variations in electoral fortunes largely appear driven by other forces. Another explanation is that such a random walk pattern reflects simple measurement error in the CMP Left-Right scores for parties (Burt 1998) . We return to this topic below. The advantages and disadvantages of these alternative measures are also discussed in Dalton, Farrell and McAllister (2011, ch. 5) and Marks (2007) . We only included parties with at least five candidates in the survey. As we might expect, the level of agreement between the public and party experts is stronger in the established democracies (r=.92) than in the new democracies (r=.81). There is also somewhat greater agreement in positioning large parties compared to smaller parties. Van der Brug (2006) finds broad consistency in the Left-Right positioning of Dutch parties by their voters, members, sub-leaders and top-leaders; also see (Dinas and Gemenis 2010; Thomassen and Schmitt 1997). 12 In creating this panel data we generally used the first two CSES modules that had party positions in two adjacent elections. In some cases the series begins with module I data, in other cases with module II. We then expanded the series with the third module of CSES, and in a few instances adding values for missing elections from the respective national election study if it used the same methodology as CSES.
The panel includes parties from 27 nations (see table in paper Appendix). We adopted a rigorous definition of party continuity. If a party split or changed its name so voters saw a different party label across elections, we typically treated this as different parties. The list of parties is available from the authors.
A second question is whether to use the total public, only voters or only party supporters to locate each party on the Left-Right scale. While there are some differences, the three measures are largely interchangeable. The correlation between the total public and voters is r=.94 and the correlation of the total public and party supporters if r=.95. Furthermore, a substantial number of parties have the same manifesto scores across elections, which suggests a limitation in measuring party change with the CMP scores. 15 An even more basic thesis argues that a shift in the position of the median voter will produce shifts in party positions to retain their voting base. There is virtually no relationship (r=.03) between the Left/Right shift in the median citizen and the Left/Right shift among political parties.
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The correlation between Left/Right change in election1-2 and election2-3 is: losers (election2) -.02, winners -.13, and no substantial change +.05. However, these correlations are not statistically significant because of our smaller N for election2-3 comparisons. The pattern suggests that some parties are both more likely to shift positions and likely to experience gains/losses over multiple elections with these two traits reinforcing one another.
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It is possible that parties differentially respond to changes in the position of the median citizen or the change in vote share interacts with past shifts in ideological position (Grofman 2004; Meguid 2005; Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009) . We intend to explore this possibility in future research.
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This is virtually the same as doing an analysis of residuals after using the Left-Right score from the first election to predict a party's score at the second election. Except in this case the model now has 100 percent of the residual variance to explain, ignoring the 90 percent predicted by time1 scores. This might exaggerate the apparent impact of predictors by ignoring the autoregressive element of Left-Right positions. See note 25.
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For example, we excluded district magnitude and majoritarian electoral system from the analyses because of their collinearity with effective number of parties. Majoritarian/PR electoral system and district magnitude had only a modest effect for the first election pair. New democracy was also correlated with the entrance of a new party (r = .41 in the first election pair), but was retained because of its theoretical significance. No other correlation was greater than . 54. 20 This measure is the absolute value of the difference between the party's Left-Right score and the midpoint on the CSES Left-Right scale. The logic is that extreme parties on the Left and Right are bound to their ideological position more than parties near the center of the political spectrum.
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There is, however, a -.16 bivariate r correlation, which has a significance level of p=.07.
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The institutional measures for the CSES elections were based on the methods described in Dalton and Anderson (2011, appendix) and similarly applied to the other elections. 23 We defined a new party as a party which won in an election, for the first time, parliamentary representation and a significant (usually greater than 5 percent) vote. Clearly there was some judgment involved since on occasion a party that had a significant impact on the party system failed to win 5 percent of the vote, and new parties had often been formed some years before the election in which they first made their breakthrough. 24 Further analyses indicate that the stronger impact for a new party in this model is largely due to the turbulence of the Japanese party system in the 1996 and 2000 elections.
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In an alternative to model 1 we added a lagged variable for a party's Left-Right position in election1. This lagged variable was the dominant predictor of the party's position in election2 (β=.97) and no other predictor was statistically significant. The predictors in models 1 and 2 thus appear much stronger because they are explaining 100 percent of the variance in the inter-election Left-Right difference; that is, essentially predicting the residuals that would result from the lagged variable model.
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A party's vote share in election1 explains 72 percent of the variance in election2. This is very high, but substantially below the 90 percent of Left-Right variance explained across pairings.
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As a preliminary analysis we calculated the stability of party positions and party salience on the taxes versus spending issue in the CHES study. These two items were only available in the 2006 and 2010 waves. Issue positions were correlated at .91 (N=164), but the party's salience of the issue was correlated
